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This paper uses self-reported data on victimization, subjective well being and 
ideology for a panel of individuals living in six Argentine cities. While no 
relationship is found between happiness and victimization experiences, a 
correlation is documented, however, between victimization experience and 
changes in ideological positions. Specifically, individuals who are the victims of 
crime are subsequently more likely than non-victims to state that inequality is 
high in Argentina and that the appropriate measure to reduce crime is to become 
less punitive (demanding lower penalties for the same crime). 
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  51.  Introduction 
[It] does not allow for the health of our children, the quality of their education, or the 
joy of their play.  It does not include the beauty of our poetry or the strength of our 
marriages, the intelligence of our public debate or the integrity of our public officials.  
It measures neither our courage, nor our wisdom, nor our devotion to our country.  It 
measures everything, in short, except that which makes life worthwhile ….. 
Senator Robert Kennedy on GDP
1 
 
Traditional economics focuses on the role of material forces in generating utility and assigns a 
relatively small role to ideological beliefs, assuming there is no reason for such beliefs to differ 
too much from reality or across people. Economists studying the costs of crime have built on 
these assumptions to derive significant direct and indirect costs of crime, which include low 
levels of human capital, destruction of property, investment in private security, and distortion of 
individual behavior, among others. In this project we provide an alternative approach to the 
evaluation of the costs of crime, which complements previous work. We study how crime 
victimization affects measures of well-being and the average beliefs of victims regarding a broad 
range of issues. The focus on happiness is a strategy that (under several assumptions) yields one 
direct measure of the costs of crime, and the focus on beliefs is important in models where 
beliefs affect policies (and other voter demands). Note that in these models, policies themselves 
might in turn affect beliefs.
2 Thus, the mechanism we study has a feedback channel (from beliefs 
to policies that reinforce the original beliefs) which might lead to multiple equilibria.
3 
Our focus on a direct measure of welfare allows us to take a broader view on the welfare 
costs of crime and assume that utility is not affected just by income. Indeed, careful examination 
of most formulations in economics show that the assumed utility functions include a term for 
leisure and, where finite horizons are used, they imply that factors that threaten the security of 
life reduce utility. This means that even the narrowest definitions of utility allow for non-
material terms such as crime to affect utility. Such a broad view takes us closer to the arguments 
made in debates surrounding the appropriateness of using GDP as an indicator of development. 
In 1973 William Nordhaus and James Tobin famously asked “Is Growth Obsolete?” Their 
answer was a partial yes. They argued in favor of making adjustments to GNP so that some value 
was given to leisure and household work and some costs to urbanization. They then constructed 
what they called a Measure of Economic Welfare for the American economy and observed that it 
                                                           
1 Cited in Mankiw (1999). 
2 Beliefs are typically defined as the combination of the available information with a set of more stable individual 
values (that condition the acceptance/rejection of particular arguments). See Zaller (1991) for a recent discussion. 
3 For work on the institutional foundations of capitalism and how beliefs shape institutions, see Piketty (1995). 
  6grew like GNP over the period under study, albeit more slowly. The Kennedy quotation at the 
beginning of the paper shows the enormous appeal that this logic has, well beyond economists. 
Indeed, a variety of authors and organizations have advocated more comprehensive measures of 
well-being, capturing other elements of modern life besides income.
4 
One problem with this approach is that it is hard to compare the effects of these variables 
without making strong structural assumptions. For example, is an increase in crime of 1 percent 
“equivalent” to a 1 percent increase in income? Besides the attractiveness of symmetric 
treatment, there is little to be said in its defense. Yet, this is what it is implied by unweighted 
aggregation, which is often the norm. In this project we tackle this issue, for the specific case of 
crime, using happiness data. Indeed, one way to read the happiness literature is as offering some 
guidance on the weights to be used in the aggregation of the variables used in the quality of life 
literature. 
Specifically, our approach to study these questions relies on using a variant of the 
happiness data analyzed by Easterlin (1974). These consist of the answers given by hundreds of 
thousands of people, across many countries and years, to a simple well-being question such as 
“On the whole, are you satisfied with the life you lead?” Such data have been used extensively 
in psychology research, where it is argued that the data pass a series of what are sometimes 
called validation exercises (see, for example, Kahneman, Diener and Schwartz, 1999). Perhaps 
the most convincing of these, consist of showing that happiness data correlate well with variables 
that are associated with physical manifestations of true internal happiness, such as smiling or 
electronic readings of the part of the brain that governs positive emotions (see below for more on 
validation). Although subjective data has been used extensively in some fields in economics, 
such as contingent valuation studies, happiness data require only a minimum of information 
processing and understanding of the workings of the economy (see Diamond and Hausman, 
1994, for a criticism of the kind of subjective data used in contingent valuation studies). 
                                                           
4 There are many such indicators of welfare. Perhaps the most famous of these is the Human Development Index in 
the Human Development Report produced by the United Nations. Considerable impetus to develop a national 
environmental indicator set occurred following the 1989 G-7 Economic Summit Leaders' request to the OECD to 
develop indicators in the context of improved decision-making. Canada is one of the most advanced in this sense, 
after passing the Well-Being Measurement Act (Bill C-268) with the purpose of developing and regularly publishing 
measures to indicate “the economic, social and environmental well-being of people, communities and ecosystems in 
Canada.” Its key provisions require a Standing Committee of the House of Commons to “receive input from the 
public through submissions and public hearings” so that they can identify “the broad societal values on which the 
set of indicators should be based.” See also the discussion in Dasgupta (2000). Nordhaus (2002) is a recent proposal 
on how to incorporate improvements in health status. 
  7The issue of crime has received relatively little attention in the happiness literature in 
economics.
5 Alesina, Di Tella and MacCulloch (2004), in a study of inequality and beliefs, 
includes a crime rate variable in happiness regressions which compare the effect of inequality on 
happiness across Europe and America. Using individual-level data from the US General Social 
Survey (1972-1994), they show for the US sample that there is a negative, albeit insignificant, 
relationship between the murder rate and reported happiness scores. Di Tella and MacCulloch 
(2008) estimate a negative correlation between happiness and the crime rate in a panel of 
European countries for the period 1975-97. Michalos and Zumbo (2000) report a negative 
correlation between being the victim of crime and life satisfaction. The closest to our project is 
an interesting and more detailed recent study by Powdthavee (2005), which exploits cross- 
sectional evidence and finds that individuals who have been victimized in South Africa are 
significantly less happy. He finds, however, that the welfare costs of criminal victimization fall 
with crime levels. Cohen (2008) studies crime and life satisfaction and reaches similar 
conclusions. See Frey and Stutzer (2002), Di Tella and MacCulloch (2006) and Kahneman and 
Krueger (2006) for reviews. 
The second focus of our paper, beyond the direct welfare costs of crime, is the impact of 
crime on beliefs. Our interest in beliefs arises from the possibility that crime may change 
people’s belief about how the economy works, and this, in turn, might lead voter preferences to 
change. To see the importance of this issue, note that an unanswered question in political 
economy is why the public’s beliefs are so anti-market, resulting in so much resistance to pro-
market policies. Indeed, capitalism does not flow to poor countries, as documented in Di Tella 
and MacCulloch (2002). This phenomenon is particularly intense in Latin America (see Lora, 
Panizza and Quispe-Agnoli, 2004). Several hypotheses have been considered in the literature. 
For example, perceptions of corruption may influence market attitudes, as explored in the 
fairness model of Di Tella and MacCulloch (2002). In this view, the backlash against markets 
occurs because reforms are perceived to involve corruption, and such acts invite retribution by 
voters in the form of taxes and government regulation. A second hypothesis is that reforms create 
winners and losers, and the latter may outnumber the former for some periods of time. If voters 
are shortsighted, they may withdraw their support. Przeworski (1991), for example, makes a 
                                                           
5 Psychologists have shown that victims of crime suffer from a variety of mental disorders, including anxiety and 
depression (see, for example, Norris and Kaniasty, 1992, and the references cited therein). 
  8related argument (see also Earle and Gehlbach, 2003, who show that those who benefited from 
the voucher privatization program in the Czech Republic were more likely to support market 
reforms). Alternatively, even the winners may dislike the reforms if they have a taste for 
equality. Finally, Lora and Olivera (2005) show that voters dislike policy switches. They show 
that voters are more tolerant of privatizations and tax reforms when they do not run counter to 
pre-electoral campaign announcements. Stokes (2001) presents substantial evidence consistent 
with this statement. An interesting question is why pro-market reforms cannot be announced 
during the campaigns, something that takes us back to the question of why is capitalism so 
unpopular in the region to begin with.  
Given our interest in beliefs, one reason to be interested in crime in Latin America is that 
anti-market sentiment and views have traditionally been accompanied by relatively insecure 
environments. The large increases in crime that accompanied the pro-market reforms of the 
1990s might have affected beliefs. Furthermore, the increases in crime were unevenly spread, 
disproportionately hitting the poor (see Di Tella, Galiani and Schargrodsky, forthcoming 2010).
6 
To the extent that voters associate pro-market reforms with crime increases, it is then 
unsurprising that voters reject markets. More importantly, Di Tella, Donna and MacCulloch 
(2008) have analyzed the relationship between crime and ideological beliefs in Latin America 
using cross-sectional data and they find that more crime is correlated with a left-wing view of the 
world (in economic matters). For example, people who were victimized also report believing that 
the distribution of income is unfair, self-place on the left of the political spectrum or disagree 
with the idea that privatizations have been good for the country. Although the correlation 
survives the inclusion of two different sets of controls for individual income (one self-reported 
and the other constructed by the interviewer), as well as a set of standard controls, the possibility 
of bias arising from unobserved heterogeneity cannot reasonably be ignored until a proper 
individual panel is used. In this paper, we attempt to tackle this issue by collecting our own data 
to study these questions in more detail, in a sample that allows for the inclusion of individual 
fixed effects. Given that we design our own questionnaire, we also included a question on 
desired punitiveness (an individual answer to a question on the appropriate punishment for a 
criminal). An auxiliary hypothesis we can test is whether people’s experience of victimization 
                                                           
6 For empirical work on ideological beliefs and property in Latin America see also Di Tella, Galiani and 
Schargrodsky (2007). 
  9affects overall beliefs or only in specific domains. Specifically, we can test whether victimization 
makes people more punitive without affecting their beliefs on economic matters, or if it moves 
people’s ideology in a bundle. The possibility of bundling is important in the literature 
discussing the nature of political beliefs, which is vast (see, for example, de Tocqueville’s 
Democracy in America and  Lipset, 1979, inter alia). The discussion, for example, in Rokeach 
(1973) considers the possibility that beliefs are part of individual traits (and therefore, the 
possibility that certain economic beliefs consistently associate with certain political beliefs).  
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the problem of crime in 
Latin America. Section 3 discusses the use of subjective data in economics. In Section 4 we 
present our estimation methodology. The crime, happiness, and ideology data are described in 
Section 5. Section 6 reports the results, and Section 7 summarizes our conclusions. 
 
2. Crime in Latin America 
 
Crime levels are extraordinarily high in Latin America. The regional homicide rate, for example, 
more than doubles the world average. Latinbarometer (2004) reports that one third of the 
interviewees or their family members have suffered a crime during the last year. As Table 1 
shows, crime is widespread throughout the region. In addition to its high level, crime has 
increased significantly during the 1990s (Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza, 2002a). In the last 
decade, the homicide rate grew 336 percent in Colombia, 300 percent in Argentina and 379 
percent in Peru (Prillaman, 2003). Opinion polls show that 90 of respondents consider crime to 
be a severe problem, and 76 percent consider their country to be less safe than in the previous 
year. 
These crime levels induce significant direct and indirect costs in terms of human capital, 
destruction of property, health expenditures, reduction in work productivity, provision of public 
and private security, investment deterrence, reduced tourism, increased insurance costs, and 
several distortions in citizens’ behavior. Londoño, Gaviria, and Guerrero (1999), for example, 
estimate the costs of violence in Latin America at 14.2 percent of GDP. Burki and Perry (1998) 
consider that income would be 25 percent higher if the region had crime rates similar to the rest 
of the world. Prillaman (2003) points out that crime may be undermining democracy in the 
region, as support for democratic institutions weakens with higher crime levels.  
  10Di Tella, Galiani and Schargrodsky (forthcoming 2010) study how crime affects different 
income groups. They have to confront the obvious difficulty that crime-avoiding activities vary 
across income groups. Thus, a lower victimization rate in one group may not reflect a lower 
burden of crime, but rather a higher investment in avoiding crime. A second difficulty is that, 
typically, only a small fraction of the population is victimized, so that empirical tests often lack 
the statistical power to detect differences across groups. In their study, Di Tella, Galiani and 
Schargrodsky take advantage of a dramatic increase in crime rates in Argentina during the late 
1990s to document how the increase in victimization experienced by the poor is larger than the 
increase endured by the rich. The difference appears large: low-income people have experienced 
increases in victimization rates that are almost 50 percent higher than those suffered by high-
income people. Second, for home robberies, where the rich can protect themselves (by hiring 
private security, for example), they find significantly larger increases in victimization rates 
amongst the poor. In contrast, for robberies on the street, where the rich can only mimic the poor, 
we find similar increases in victimization for both income groups. Third, they document direct 
evidence of pecuniary and non-pecuniary protection activities by both the rich and poor, ranging 
from the avoidance of dark places to the hiring of private security. 
Unfortunately, the data available for research on crime in Latin America are relatively 
poor, and there is accordingly little prior work in the area. This is somewhat paradoxical given 




3.  Well-Being Data  
 
The use of subjective data implies a departure from traditional economics, where individual 
preferences are inferred by choice, not some vague notion of how people say they feel or what 
they say they want. The principle could be summarized by the dictum “watch what I do, not what 
I say” and is made explicit in the work on revealed preference (Samuelson, 1948). A relatively 
recent development is the interest in data on people’s opinions regarding some variable of 
interest. Perhaps the most convincing work deals with the taste for redistribution (see Luttmer, 
                                                           
7 Some few exceptions are Gaviria and Pagés (1999), Gaviria (2000), the IDB Research Network Projectand the 
resulting papers collected by Londoño, Gaviria and Guerrero (2000), the papers by Fajnzylber, Lederman and 
Loayza (1998, 2002a, and 2002b), Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2004), and the articles collected by Di Tella, 
Edwards and Schargrodsky (forthcoming 2010). 
  112001, and Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005) and the study of motivation (Frey, Oberholzer-Gee and 
Eichenberger, 1996). This approach relies on the individual's ability to formulate an opinion on 
the topic being asked. For example, if they are asked about cuts in the welfare state they are 
assumed to be able to form an intelligent opinion on the subject that incorporates all the relevant 
information, such as the tax gains and insurance losses that arise or any improvements in the 
unemployment rate that can occur. In fact, the use of this kind of data for valuation of the 
environment has been criticized precisely on these grounds (see, for example, Diamond and 
Hausman, 1994).  
An approach that reduces the informational and computational burden on the individual is 
to simply ask them a well-being question and then correlate the answers with changes in the 
variable of interest. For example, in order to investigate the benefits of, say, the welfare state, the 
approach consists of asking individuals if they are happy and then see if this correlates with 
changes in some parameter measuring the generosity of the welfare state. This relies only on the 
ability of individuals to evaluate their own level of happiness with some precision. Psychologists 
who have worked with these data have provided an array of evidence showing that well-being 
data are correlated with physical reactions that are associated with true happiness. These include 
Pavot (1991) and Ekman, Davidson and Friesen (1990) who find that individuals reporting to be 
very happy tend to smile more (i.e., the duration of so-called “Duchenne smiles”). Shedler, 
Mayman and Manis (1993) show that happiness data are negatively correlated with heart rate and 
blood pressure measures of responses to stress, and Sutton and Davidson (1997) show that 
happiness data are positively correlated with electroencephalogram measures of prefrontal brain 
activity (the part of the brain that is associated with optimism and other positive states of mind). 
Lastly, average happiness levels within countries seem to be negatively correlated with suicide 
rates, an event that presumably expresses true internal unhappiness (see Di Tella, MacCulloch 
and Oswald, 2003).
8 
Konow and Earley (1999) discuss a number of other studies that are helpful in assessing 
the validity of well-being data, some of them based on correlating the data with other subjective 
data. Siedlitz, Wyer and Diener (1997), for example, show that happiness data correlate well 
with subject recall of positive life events. Diener (1984) and Sandvik, Diener and Siedlitz (1993) 
                                                           
8 Inglehart (1990) finds some evidence of a positive correlation looking at the cross-sectional evidence. 
  12have shown that the data are correlated with reports of friends and family members on the 
subject’s level of well-being.  
A potential problem with all subjective data is framing, the fact that sometimes what 
appear to be similar questions elicit different answers depending on the way they are asked. The 
validation exercises described above seem to indicate that the framing problem with happiness 
data appears to be small. Furthermore, Fordyce (1988) shows that the different measures of well-
being correlate well with one another, a finding that has also been later confirmed by Konow and 
Earley (1999) with experimental data, by Blanchflower and Oswald (2000) for data from the 
United Kingdom and the United States, and by Di Tella, MacCulloch and Oswald (2003) for data 
from 12 OECD countries. 
The psychology literature has also considered the possibility that subjects are influenced 
by what they believe to be the socially desirable response when they answer surveys. If the social 
norm is to be happy, subjects may bias their response upwards. Since the first studies in the area, 
psychologists have found evidence pointing out that this concern may be exaggerated (e.g., 
Rorer, 1965, and Bradburn, 1969). Konow and Earley (1999) present experimental evidence 
showing that the Marlowe-Crowne measure of social desirability is uncorrelated with happiness 
data.  
A different approach to study the validity of happiness data is taken in Di Tella, 
MacCulloch and Oswald (2003), who present micro-econometric happiness and life satisfaction 
regressions for 12 European countries and the United States. These regress the well-being 
answers on a set of personal characteristics, including age, sex, education, employment status, 
income, and marital status. They show that these equations share a similar structure across 
countries, an unlikely event if the data contained no information. 
Following Easterlin’s 1974 paper, showing that happiness was essentially flat in the 
presence of rising income in post-war America, a small happiness literature has emerged in 
economics.
9 The literature on the relationship between income and happiness includes 
Winkelman and Winkelman (1998), who use individual panel data for Germany, Di Tella, 
MacCulloch and Oswald (2003), who look at the evidence across a panel of 12 OECD countries, 
and Gardner and Oswald (2001), who use data on lottery winners. Happiness data have also been 
                                                           
9 Argyle (1987), chapter 5, discusses the vast psychological literature on income and happiness. For references to the 
large literature on subjective well-being in psychology and political science, the reader is referred to Kahneman et al 
(1999), Diener and Suh (2000), Veenhoven (1988), Inglehart (1990), Lane (2002), inter alia. 
  13used to investigate a number of other outstanding issues in economics, including the costs of 
becoming unemployed (Clark and Oswald, 1994), the role of democratic institutions (Frey and 
Stutzer, 2000), the structure of individual preferences (Konow and Earley, 1999), the inflation-
unemployment trade-off (Di Tella, MacCulloch and Oswald, 2001), macroeconomic volatility 
(Wolfers, 2002), entrepreneurship (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1998), the environment (Chapter  
11 in van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell,  2004), partisan versus opportunistic models (Di Tella 
and MacCulloch, 2005), inequality (Alesina, Di Tella and MacCulloch, 2004; Graham and 
Pettinato, 2002), public policy on addiction (Gruber and Mullainathan, 2002) and the role of 




The goal of this paper is to study the effect on happiness and ideology of becoming a victim of a 
crime. In principle, this impact could be analyzed running the following regression model: 
 
i i i i i X Crime Beliefs Happiness ε γ β α + + + = / ,   (1) 
 
where  Happinessi or Beliefsi are measures of personal satisfaction or ideological beliefs of 
individual i, Crimei indicates whether the individual or her/his household members have been 
victimized, Xi is a vector of controls, and εi is the error term. 
A direct problem with this specification is that omitted factors could be correlated with 
both crime victimization and happiness or ideology. For example, different socioeconomic 
groups may simultaneously reach different satisfaction levels, possess different political ideas, 
and be exposed to different victimization rates or be able to hire differential levels of self-
protection measures. A significantly superior specification is given by the model: 
 
it t i it it it it X Crime Beliefs Happiness ε μ η γ β α + + + + + = / ,   (2) 
 
where now in a panel specification Happinessit or Beliefsit are measures of personal satisfaction 
of individual i in period t, Xit is a vector of controls, including time effects or city-time effects,  i η  
is an individual fixed effect, and  t μ  is a time fixed effect. It is certainly possible that omitted 
variables could jointly determine happiness and victimization levels, but most of the omitted 
factors we could think of will be fixed over time. Therefore, a panel specification that 
  14incorporates individual fixed effects allows us to better identify the causal effect of becoming 
victim of a crime on quality of life and ideological beliefs. 
 
5. Crime, Happiness, and Ideology Data 
 
As explained in the previous section, the identification of the happiness and ideology effects of 
crime victimization crucially requires a panel data structure. We exploit here five waves of a 
large victimization questionnaire run in six Argentine cities. The survey was run in November 
2006, May 2007, November 2007, May 2008, and November 2008. It has an annual panel 
structure: 2,336 interviews of 1,168 households were performed (417 households were 
interviewed in November 2006 and re-interviewed in November 2007, 474 households were 
interviewed in May 2007 and re-interviewed in May 2008, and, finally, 277 households were 
interviewed in November 2007 and re-interviewed in November 2008). The surveys were 
conducted by telephone by the opinion poll company Poliarquia Consultores SA using the C13 
CATI system for Windows. The sample universe is composed of household heads or their 
spouses residing in the City of Buenos Aires, Great Buenos Aires, Córdoba, Mendoza, Tucumán 
and Rosario. In 13.5 percent of the cases, the person answering the second wave of the panel 
survey is not the same than the one answering the first wave, although we always confirm that 
the household has not changed. The total of 2,336 interviews was distributed as follows: City of 
Buenos Aires (230), Greater Buenos Aires (370), Córdoba (135), Rosario (152), Mendoza (130) 
and Tucumán (151). The population of these cities represents almost 45 percent of the total 
population of the country. 
The survey first started by asking about victimization suffered by the respondent or 
her/his household members during the previous twelve months. Fortunately for this study, but 
unfortunately for Argentine society, the reported rates were very high: 34.5 percent for the City 
of Buenos Aires, 39.9 percent for the Greater Buenos Aires area, 37.6 percent for Córdoba, 38.5 
percent for Rosario, 41.7 percent for Mendoza and 45.2 percent for Tucumán, giving an overall 
average of 39.3 percent.
10 For those households providing a positive response, a long set of 
precise questions about the exact type of crime were asked, including the use of violence, the 
type of crime, physical damage, amounts stolen, which member of the household was victimized, 
gender, etc. The survey also included a standard question on life satisfaction and some questions 
                                                           
10 These figures correspond to November 2006. 
  15on ideological beliefs. Appendix 1 presents the (translated) survey questions and definitions of 
the variables, and Appendix 2 provides the summary statistics.  
Table 2 shows the victimization level of the households included in our sample. More 
than 36 percent of our households have been a victim of a crime, and more than 19 percent of 
households have been a victim of a violent crime. Also, more than 19 households have been a 
victim of a non-violent crime (such as burglary, auto theft, motorcycle theft, larceny, fraud, or 
corruption). In the case of violent robbery, where we asked the respondent whether he or she was 
the crime victim or a household member, the respondent was the victim in about half of the 
violent crime cases. In addition, Appendix 3 describes crime victims by presenting summary 




In Table 3, we explore the effect of crime victimization on our happiness measure. In the first 
column we consider the responses given by the household members who answered the survey, as 
the same person may not have answered both surveys.
11 In the second column, we restrict 
attention to the households where the same person answered both surveys (identified by gender 
and age). This restricts the number of households by 14 percent from 1,112 to 960 households. 
Each cell of the table shows the coefficient from a different regression where the same dependent 
variable, the happiness measure, is regressed to different victimization variables: general 
victimization, violent robbery, the number of violent robberies, whether the respondent was the 
household member who suffered the crime, the use of arms, personal threats and fights, 
homicide, sexual offenses, kidnappings and non-violent crimes (such as burglary, auto theft, 
motorcycle theft, larceny, fraud or corruption larceny). None of the coefficients are significant, 
showing a lack of response of our happiness measure to crime victimization. The only large 
coefficient is on homicides, but it remains statistically insignificant. See Di Tella, MacCulloch 
and Schargrodsky (2009). 
We can speculate on different reasons for why our respondents do not report the expected 
well-being costs of being victimized. One possibility is that the survey instrument does not 
capture the suffering produced by crime victimization. Another alternative is that there are 
failures in recall biases and people do not answer properly the question on whether household 
                                                           
11 We only consider the cases where the same family lives in the house in both waves of the panel survey. 
  16members have been victim of a crime only in the last 12 months. These reporting failures would 
hurt our identification strategy. It is also possible that the high crime levels in Argentina have 
reduced the impact of victimization on happiness. Similar results have been found by Graham 
and Chattopadhyay (2009) on Afghanistan, where individuals seem to adapt to high levels of 
corruption and crime by showing low well-being costs. Likewise, Powdthavee (2005) shows that 
the welfare costs of criminal victimization fall as crime levels increase in South Africa. In high-
crime areas, people might come to expect being victimized, so that they may have already 
internalized those well-being costs, they might eventually find the experience less traumatic than 
expected, or they might suffer less stigmatization attached to being victimized. Our exercise is 
specifically designed for capturing individual victimization effects, without being able to capture 
(because of the necessary inclusion of time effects), the happiness impact of aggregate crime 
levels.
12 
In Table 4, we explore the effect of crime victimization on the inequality measure. This 
variable captures the view of respondents on inequality in the Argentine society. The structure of 
the table is exactly like of Table 3. In the first column we consider the responses given by any 
household member answering the survey, whereas in the second column, we restrict attention to 
the households where the same person answered both surveys. The results show that crime 
victims develop a significantly worse opinion of inequality in Argentina, i.e., they view society 
as more unequal after becoming victims of a crime. 
In Table 5, we explore the effect of crime victimization on the variable that captures 
opinions of the necessary measures to address insecurity. This variable is based on a survey open 
question and takes the value of 1 for answers classified as heavy-handed (such as increasing the 
severity of punishment, disabling criminals, and capital punishment) and takes the value of 0 for 
policy measures aiming to reduce unemployment and inequality, reduce police corruption, and 
improve education.
13 We follow the same structure as in the previous tables, but as the dependent 
variable is a dummy variable, in columns 1 and 3 we use an OLS specification and in columns 2 
and 4 a Logit specification. For the regressions where the same household member answered 
both panel surveys, we find that crime victims become more in favor of measures to improve 
inequality, employment and education. This might sound surprising, as we could expect crime 
                                                           
12 Our results are similar when city-specific time-effects are included, rather than general time-effects. 
13 “Heavy-handed” is a free translation of the Spanish phrase “mano dura,” literally “tough hand.” 
  17victims to become more in favor of heavy-handed policies, but it is consistent with the result in 
the previous table showing that respondents perceive society as more unequal after crime 
victimization. We can hypothesize our crime victims suffer a sort of Stockholm syndrome, where 
they comprehend the unequal backgrounds of criminals and propose educational, employment, 
welfare, and police training programs, rather than more punitive policies.
14 
Using the same structure, we analyze in Table 6 the impact of crime victimization on 
respondents’ opinion of whether juvenile criminals should be treated as adults. In Table 7 we 
analyze the effect of crime victimization on responses on the use of prison sentences for 
recidivist thieves. We find no effect of crime victimization on these opinion variables. 
Again using the same presentation structure, we analyze in Table 8 the impact of crime 
victimization on respondents’ opinion on meritocracy. The dependent variable captures 
respondents’ answers on whether effort pays. For the regressions where the household 
respondent did not change, becoming a victim of a crime turns people towards the direction of 
thinking that effort does not pay. The effects, however, are not statistically significant. 
In Tables 9 and 10, we further explore the robustness of our findings, focusing on the 
regressions on happiness and opinions on inequality, heavy-handed policies, and effort-pays, for 
the households where the household respondent did not change. In Table 9, we consider whether 
effects can vary by gender, age, and educational level. We also consider separately households 
who had not been victimized at the time of the baseline survey, for which the panel structure 
could more powerfully identify changes in crime victimization.
15 For happiness, column 1 shows 
that disaggregating the effects by groups does not change the previous finding of lack of 
significant results. The effects vary in sign and are not statistically significant for men, women, 
young, old, more educated, less educated, and for households who had not being victimized at 
the baseline survey. 
For the opinions on inequality, the second column of Table 9 shows that, although all the 
groups consider the society to be more unequal after becoming a victim of a crime, the effects 
are statistically significant for the women and the old. In regard to support for heavy-handed 
                                                           
14 Stockholm syndrome is a psychological response argued to have been observed in abducted hostages, in which the 
hostage shows signs of loyalty to the hostage-taker. The syndrome is named after a famous bank robbery in 
Stockholm in 1973, in which the victims became emotionally attached to their captors, and defended them after 
freedom. The syndrome is an example of a defense mechanism of identification. 
15 Instead, for households that were victims of a crime in the first wave and not in the second, identification requires 
household to remember correctly the timing of the suffered crime.   
  18policies, the third column shows that, although all groups favor more lenient measures after 
becoming a victim of a crime, the effects are statistically significant for women, the more 
educated, the young, and households who had not been victimized at the baseline survey.
16 In 
general, greater tolerance for criminals seems to come from groups who might consider 
themselves better off. Finally, the fourth column shows that effects on meritocratic beliefs 
fluctuate in sign and are not statistically significant. 
In Table 10 we investigate, first for all the households and then for the households for 
which the respondent did not change, whether a standard (repeated) cross-section specification 
produces the same results. We find that the effect of crime victimization on inequality opinions 
remains significant. While the effect of crime victimization generally remains insignificant, it 
now becomes significant for homicides.  
In Tables 11 and 12, we aim to compare the effect of crime victimization on happiness 
relative to the effect of other major household events, such a improving or worsening the family 
economic situation, or experiencing birth, death, divorce (or break-up), disease, marriage, etc. 
Crime victimization is expressed in changes in Table 11 and in levels in Table 12. For birth, 
death, divorce (or break-up), disease, marriage, our sample probably has little statistical power. 
In columns 1, 2, 6, and 7, the results show a negative and significant effect on happiness of 
worsening of the individual economic situation of the respondent and her/his children. The effect 
is asymmetric. Improvements in personal economic situation are not accompanied by a similarly 
positive and significant coefficient. Moreover, we continue to find in this alternative 
specification a lack of effect of crime victimization on the happiness variable. 
Finally, in columns 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, and 10, we explore the effect on three alternative 
happiness variables: whether the respondent would like to enjoy more days like the previous day, 
whether he/she smiled in the previous day, and whether he/she was worried in the previous day. 
For the three variables we find, like for our main happiness measure, a significant effect of the 
worsening of the individual economic situation, but no effect of crime victimization. 
 
                                                           
16 Similar results are obtained under a Logit specification. 
  197. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we take an alternative approach to study the costs of crime using subjective, “soft” 
data. It relies on two types of data: happiness and beliefs. Our interest in happiness data is 
justified because it provides a direct (albeit subjective) measure of welfare. And our interest in 
people’s ideological beliefs is justified because a possible indirect cost of crime is that 
victimization might change people’s view of how the world works (for example, how unfair the 
distribution of income is) and this might cause people to prefer different policies. 
We implement a survey to elicit individual’s response at two different points in time, 
allowing us to provide panel estimates of the crime-happiness and crime-beliefs correlations. 
Although we exhausted possible model specifications, our results find no evidence of a crime-
happiness correlation; this coincides with previous findings in high-crime environments. On the 
other hand, we find a robust, positive correlation between crime victimization and beliefs that 
can be interpreted as being on the left of the political spectrum, such as the belief that the 
distribution of income is very unequal, or that criminals should not be too punished too severely.   
A plausible interpretation of our findings on crime victimization and beliefs is as follows. 
Victimization makes the issue of crime salient to victims (but not as much to non-victims), and 
victims of crime take the view that the distribution of income in Argentina is more unequal than 
they had previously believed. In turn, people who believe that inequality is high take an 
understanding view and are more likely to think that an individual has decided to become a 
criminal out of need rather than malice. Individuals who provide their opinions on how to punish 
criminals that they believe are relatively kind (i.e., criminals that are not on the “mean” side) are 
unlikely to demand very tough sentences. 
These empirical results are consistent with the theoretical model by Di Tella and Dubra 
(2008), where beliefs about the fairness of the distribution of income determine views on   
economic policies (i.e., tax rates), whereas here those beliefs determine opinions on judicial 
policies (i.e., penal sentences). If redistributive policies have hampered growth in Latin America, 
and the lack of growth is one of the reasons for the high crime levels, our findings could 
contribute one piece of the puzzle of understanding Latin America poverty traps: crime can 
encourage beliefs that promote policies that, in turn, reduce growth and foster crime. 
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Happiness: Satisfaction with life in general, in a scale from 0 (completely unsatisfied) to 10 
(completely satisfied).  
 
∆Happiness: absolute variation of “Happiness” between two periods of time  
 
Inequality Perceptions: In a scale from 0  to 10, where “0” stands for a society with a very 
uneven income distribution, where wealth is concentrated among a few and “10” stands for a 
very even income distribution, how would you characterize the Argentine society?  
 
Heavy-handed: Dummy variable based on the open question: “According to you, what would be 
the best way to solve the problem of crime”, and the spontaneous answers are classified into: 
 
0 
LOWER UNEMPLOYMENT RATE. 
MORE AND BETTER EDUCATION/MORE EDUCATION BUDGET.  
IMPROVE PRISONS. 
IMPROVE INCOME DISTRIBUTION/ LOWER SOCIAL INEQUALITY. 
MORE POLICE ON THE STREETS. 
END WITH POLICE CORRUPTION. 
IMPROVE POLICE  TRAINING. 
1 
MORE SEVERE PUNISHMENTS/NEW SEVERE LAWS. 
IMPROVE THE  JUDICIAL´S ARM PERFORMANCE 




A residual category of “others” is excluded from the sample.  
 
Juvenile Punishment: Dummy variable based on the question: “People have different beliefs 
about the punishment that juvenile delinquents deserve. Think for example of a young 15 year 




HE SHOULD BE PUNISHED ACCORDING TO A JUVENILE-SPECIFIC REGIME, WHERE 
SENTENCES ARE LESS SEVERE THAN THE ONES FOR ADULTS. 
HE SHOULD BE HELD IN A YOUTH DETENTION CENTER UNTIL THE JUDGE ORDERS HIS 
RELEASE. 
HE SHOULD BE RELEASED. 
1  HE SHOULD BE JUDGED AS AN ADULT. 
 
Imprisonment Punishment: Dummy variable based on the question “People have different 
beliefs about punishment that delinquents deserve. Think for example a 20 year old who is found 
guilty of robbery for the second time.  This time he has stolen a TV set. What should his 
punishment be?” and the possible values are: 





1  PRISON. 
 




MUCH BETTER THAN THOSE WHO DO NOT WORK AS HARD. 
BETTER THAN THOSE WHO DO NOT WORK AS HARD. 
A LITTLE BETTER THAN THOSE WHO DO NOT WORK AS HARD. 
0 
THE SAME AS THOSE WHO DO NOT WORK AS HARD. 
WORSE THAN THOSE WHO DO NOT WORK AS HARD. 
 
Laughed yesterday: Dummy variable based on the question “Did you laugh a lot yesterday?” 
This variable is only available in a cross-section. 
 
Worried yesterday: Dummy variable based on the question “Were you worried yesterday?” 
This variable is only available in a cross-section. 
 
More days like yesterday: Dummy variable bases on the question “Would you like to have 




Victim of a crime: Dummy variable based on the question “In the last 12 months, have you or 
any member of your cohabitating family been victim of a crime such as robbery, theft, injuries, 
threats, kidnapping, murder, fraud, vandalism, corruption, or sexual offenses?  Please take your 
time.  Do not consider relatives who don’t live in your home.  (Spontaneous response) ”. 
 
∆Victim of a crime: This variable reflects the absolute variation of “Victim of a crime” 
between two periods of time. 
 
Victim of a violent robbery: Dummy variable that considers the spontaneous response  of 
robbery with violence, based on the question “In the last 12 months, have you or any member of 
your family been victim of a crime such as robbery with violence, theft, injuries, threats, 
kidnapping, murder, fraud, vandalism, corruption, or sexual offenses?”  
 
Number of violent robberies: This variable measures the number of times the members of a 
house suffered a violent robbery in the 12 months prior to the survey. 
 
Respondent victim of a violent crime: Dummy variable reflecting whether the interviewed 
himself/herself was the household member who suffered a violent robbery in the 12 months prior 
to the survey.  
 
  28Victim of crime with the use of arms: Dummy variable reflecting whether the interviewed 
suffered a violent armed robbery in the 12 months prior to the survey. 
  
Victim of injuries or threats: Dummy variable that considers the spontaneous response  of 
injuries or threats, based on the question “In the last 12 months, have you or any member of your 
family been victim of a crime such as robbery, theft, injuries, threats, kidnapping, murder, fraud, 
vandalism, corruption, or sexual offenses?” 
 
Victim of homicide: This variable is based on the direct question about murder in the 12 months 
prior to the survey.  
 
Victim of sexual offense: This variable is based on the direct question about sexual offense in 
the 12 months prior to the survey. 
 
Victim of kidnapping: This variable is based on the direct question about kidnapping in the 12 
months prior to the survey. 
 
Victim of a burglary, auto theft, motorcycle theft, larceny, fraud or corruption: This 
variable is based on the direct question about burglary, auto theft, motorcycle theft, larceny, 
fraud or corruption in the 12 months prior to the survey. 
 
Death of relative: Dummy variable based on the question “In the last 12 months, have you 
experienced the loss of someone you love?” This variable is only available in a cross-section. 
 
Disease of relative: Dummy variable based on the question “In the last 12 months, did you, or a 
son, or daughter, or a spouse or a grandchild of yours suffer a serious disease (that did not suffer 
before)?” This variable is only available in a cross-section. 
 
Married / partnered: Dummy variable based on the question “In the last 12 months, did you get 
married or move in with someone or start dating someone?” This variable is only available in a 
cross-section. 
 
Break-up: Dummy variable based on the question “In the last 12 months, did you get divorced 
or separated?” This variable is only available in a cross-section. 
 
Widowed: Dummy variable based on the question “In the last 12 months, did you widow? This 
variable is only available in a cross-section. 
 
Child married / partnered: Dummy variable based on the question “In the last 12 months, did 
an adult children of yours get married or move in with someone or start dating someone?” This 
variable is only available in a cross-section. 
 
Child break-up: Dummy variable based on the question “In the last 12 months, did adult 
children of yours get divorced or separated?” This variable is only available in a cross-section. 
 
  29Improved economic situation: Dummy variable based on the question “In the last 12 months, 
did you and/or your spouse get a job or improved your economic situation significantly?” This 
variable is only available in a cross-section. 
 
Worsened economic situation: Dummy variable based on the question “In the last 12 months, 
did you and/or your spouse lose your job or worsen your economic situation significantly?” This 
variable is only available in a cross-section. 
 
Child improved economic situation: Dummy variable based on the question “In the last 12 
months, did your children improve their economic situation significantly?” This variable is only 
available in a cross-section. 
 
Child worsened economic situation: Dummy variable based on the question “In the last 12 
months, did your children worsen their economic situation significantly?” This variable is only 
available in a cross-section. 
 
Child birth: Dummy variable based on the question “In the last 12 months, did your have a 
child?” This variable is only available in a cross-section. 
 
Grandchild birth: Dummy variable based on the question “In the last 12 months, did your have 
a grandchild?” This variable is only available in a cross-section. 
 
  30APPENDIX 2. Summary Statistics (for same household respondent sample) 
Variable  Obs Mean Std. 
Dev.  Min Max 
Happiness  1973 7.78 1.74  0  10 
∆Happiness  734 0.09 1.87  -9  10 
Inequality Perceptions  1,937 3.59  2.36  0  10 
Heavy-handed  1,474 0.25  0.44  0  1 
Juvenile Punishments  1,792 0.49  0.50  0  1 
Imprisonment Punishment  1,750 0.57  0.49  0  1 
Meritocratic beliefs  1,832 0.75  0.44  0  1 
Laughed yesterday  754 0.57 0.50  0  1 
Worried yesterday  769 0.44 0.50  0  1 
More days like yesterday  749 0.69 0.46  0  1 
Victim of a crime  2,021 0.36  0.48  0  1 
∆Victim of a crime  769 -0.06 0.06  -1  1 
Victim of a violent robbery  2,021 0.20  0.40  0  1 
Number of violent robberies  2,021 0.29  0.66  0  10 
Respondent victim of a violent crime   2,021 0.09  0.28  0  1 
Victim of crime with the use of arms  2,021 0.05  0.22  0  1 
Victim of injuries or threats  2,021 0.01  0.11  0  1 
Victim of homicide  2,021 0.00  0.05  0  1 
Victim of sexual offense  2,021 0.02  0.15  0  1 
Victim of kidnapping  2,021 0.01  0.08  0  1 
Victim of a burglary, auto theft, motorcycle theft, larceny, fraud or corruption  2,021 0.19  0.39  0  1 
Death of relative  773 0.27 0.44  0  1 
Disease of relative  773 0.17 0.37  0  1 
Married / partnered  770 0.02 0.13  0  1 
Break-up  770 0.03 0.17  0  1 
Widowed  770 0.02 0.12  0  1 
Child married / partnered  769 0.06 0.24  0  1 
Child break-up  769 0.04 0.21  0  1 
Improved economic situation  773 0.15 0.36  0  1 
Worsened economic situation  773 0.20 0.40  0  1 
Child improved economic situation  658 0.16 0.37  0  1 
Child worsened economic situation  658 0.08 0.27  0  1 
Child birth  773 0.03 0.17  0  1 
Grandchild birth  773 0.12 0.33  0  1 
Note: Only for households where the same respondent answered both surveys. 
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APPENDIX 3. Survey Respondents’ Characteristics 










Household Head  63.0% 62.8% 
Male  31.8% 31.9% 
Respondent victim of a violent crime  8.3% 8.6% 
Respondent victim of theft  9.8% 9.5% 
Age  52.4 52.1 
HH lives with a partner (married or unmarried)  57% 57% 
Number of people in the household  3.7 3.8 
Number of people in the household below 18 years old  1.0 1.0 
Respondent partner's age  50.8 50.5 
Argentine Household Head  95.2% 94.9% 
Education of HH (years)  15.0 15.0 
Education of HH's partner (years)  14.8 14.8 
Unemployed HH  4.6% 4.7% 
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Percentage of Households that Have Been Victims of a crime in the last year 
 
  Victimized  Not Victimized  Sample Size 
Argentina 42  57  1,200 
Bolivia 36  63 1,200 
Brazil 36  63  1,200 
Colombia 30  68  1,200 
Costa Rica  33  67  1,004 
Chile 34  66  1,200 
Ecuador 34  65  1,200 
El Salvador  40  60  1,008 
Guatemala 37  62  1,006 
Honduras 32  67  1,006 
Mexico 64  36 1,200 
Nicaragua 32  67  1,010 
Panama 25  72 1,004 
Paraguay 41  59  6,00 
Peru 37  63  1,200 
Uruguay 29  71  1,200 
Venezuela 47  52  1,200 
Total 37  62  18,638 
Source: Latinobarómetro (2004). 
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Table 2. Frequency of Crime Victimization 
 








Household member victim of a crime  36.1% 36.3% 
Household member victim of a violent robbery  19.6%  19.9% 
Respondent victim of a violent robbery  8.3%  8.6% 
Household member victim of crime with use of arms  4.8%  5.0% 
Household member victim of injuries and threats  1.4%  1.3% 
Household member victim of homicide  0.3%  0.3% 
Household member victim of sexual offense  2.1%  2.3% 
Household member victim of kidnapping  0.7%  0.7% 
Household member victim of burglary, auto theft, motorcycle theft, 
larceny, fraud or corruption  19.3% 19.2% 
Note: In the first column we consider responses from any household member. In the second column, we only 














Victim of a crime  -0.01  0.05 
 (0.09)  (0.10) 
Victim of a violent robbery  -0.04  -0.00 
 (0.11)  (0.12) 
Number of violent robberies  0.01  0.04 
 (0.06)  (0.07) 
Respondent victim of a violent crime  -0.07  0.02 
 (0.18)  (0.19) 
Victim of crime with the use of arms  -0.19  -0.04 
 (0.26)  (0.26) 
Victim of injuries or threats  0.19  0.20 
 (0.29)  (0.34) 
Victim of homicide  -2.01  -2.02 
 (1.84)  (1.84) 
Victim of sexual offense  -0.49  -0.42 
 (0.32)  (0.34) 
Victim of kidnapping  0.12  -0.02 
 (0.48)  (0.52) 
Victim of burglary, auto theft, motorcycle 
theft, larceny, fraud or corruption 
-0.10 -0.05 
(0.10) (0.11) 
Observations 2,224  1,920 
Number of  households  1,112  960 
Notes: All columns present OLS regressions with households fixed effects. Each cell 
presents the coefficient on the independent variable from a different regression that 
also includes time-fixed effects. In column (1) we consider responses from any 
household member. In column (2) we only consider households where the same 
respondent answered both surveys. Appendix 1 presents the variables definitions.   
Standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10 percent level; ** significant at 5 
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Table 4.Crime Victimization and Inequality Perceptions 
 









Victim of a crime  -0.27*  -0.36** 
   (0.15)  (0.15) 
Victim of a violent robbery  -0.17  -0.24 
   (0.17)  (0.17) 
Number of violent robberies  -0.06  -0.09 
   (0.09)  (0.10) 
Respondent victim of a violent crime  0.13  0.04 
   (0.25)  (0.26) 
Victim of crime with the use of arms  -0.21  -0.05 
   (0.26)  (0.26) 
Victim of injuries or threats  0.41  0.63 
   (0.53)  (0.52) 
Victim of homicide  0.50  0.54 
   (1.58)  (1.59) 
Victim of sexual offense  -0.24  -0.10 
   (0.49)  (0.51) 
Victim of kidnapping  -1.34**  -1.27** 
   (0.55)  (0.62) 
Victim of burglary, auto theft, 




Observations 2,140  1,846 
Number of households  1,070  923 
Notes: All columns present OLS regressions with households fixed effects. Each 
cell presents the coefficient on the independent variable from a different regression 
that also includes time-fixed effects. In column (1) we consider responses from any 
household member. In column (2) we only consider households where the same 
respondent answered both surveys. Appendix 1 presents the variables definitions.  
Standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10 percent level; ** significant at 5 
percent level; *** significant at 1 percent level. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Victim of a crime  -0.04  -0.41  -0.07**  -0.85** 
    (0.03) (0.30) (0.03) (0.38) 
Victim of a violent robbery  0.05  0.35  0.03  0.20 
    (0.04) (0.31) (0.04) (0.33) 
Number of violent robberies  0.03*  0.28  0.03  0.22 
    (0.02) (0.17) (0.03) (0.17) 
Respondent victim of a violent crime  -0.02  -0.22  -0.02  -0.21 
    (0.05) (0.49) (0.06) (0.49) 
Victim of crime with the use of arms  0.01  0.07  0.01  0.09 
    (0.07) (0.61) (0.08) (0.61) 
Victim of injuries or threats  -0.05    -0.29**   
    (0.04)  (0.14)  
Victim of homicide  -0.05    -0.03   
    (0.04)  (0.03)  
Victim of sexual offense  -0.14*  -1.36  -0.11  -1.22 
    (0.08) (1.11) (0.08) (1.14) 
Victim  of  kidnapping  0.02 0.47 0.00 0.42 
    (0.17) (1.44) (0.21) (1.43) 
Victim of burglary, auto theft, 
motorcycle theft, larceny, fraud or 
corruption   
-0.07* -0.57*  -0.10**  -0.82** 
(0.04) (0.30) (0.04) (0.35) 
Observations  1,294 290 1,104 238 
Number  of  households  647 145 552 119 
Notes: Columns (1) and (3) present OLS regressions with households fixed effects. Columns (2) and 
(4) present Logit regressions with households fixed effects. Each cell presents the coefficient on the 
independent variable from a different regression that also includes time-fixed effects. In columns (1) 
and (2) we consider responses from any household member. In columns (3) and (4) we only consider 
households where the same respondent answered both surveys. The number of observations in the 
Logit regressions is reduced when households fixed effects predict success or failure with certainty. 
Some Logit regressions cannot be run for this reason. Appendix 1 presents variables definitions. 
Standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10 percent level; ** significant at 5 percent level; *** 
significant at 1 percent level. 
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(1) (2) (3)  (4) 
Victim of a crime  0.01  0.04  0.01  0.01 
    (0.03) (0.22) (0.03)  (0.25) 
Victim of a violent robbery  -0.02 -0.17 -0.04  -0.33 
    (0.03) (0.26) (0.03)  (0.29) 
Number of violent robberies  -0.01  -0.04  -0.01  -0.04 
    (0.02) (0.12) (0.02)  (0.14) 
Respondent victim of a violent crime  0.03  0.14  0.02  0.09 
    (0.05) (0.36) (0.05)  (0.40) 
Victim of crime with the use of arms  0.03  0.11  0.02  -0.05 
    (0.06) (0.53) (0.06)  (0.61) 
Victim of injuries or threats  0.11  0.97  0.19**   
    (0.08) (1.19) (0.08)   
Victim of homicide  -0.20    -0.20   
   (0.17)    (0.17)   
Victim of sexual offense  -0.08  -0.67  -0.09  -0.68 
    (0.08) (0.73) (0.08)  (0.75) 
Victim of kidnapping  -0.15    -0.08   
   (0.09)    (0.08)   
Victim of burglary, auto theft, 
motorcycle theft, larceny, fraud or 
corruption    
0.04 0.24  0.05* 0.41 
(0.03) (0.24) (0.03)  (0.28) 
Observations  1,876 528 1,618  448 
Number of households  938  264  809  224 
Notes: Columns (1) and (3) present OLS regressions with households fixed effects. Columns (2) and 
(4) present Logit regressions with households fixed effects.  Each cell presents the coefficient on the 
independent variable from a different regression that also includes time-fixed effects. In columns (1) 
and (2) we consider responses from any household member. In columns (3) and (4) we only consider 
households where the same respondent answered both surveys.  The number of observations in the 
Logit regressions is reduced when households fixed effects predict success or failure with certainty. 
Some Logit regressions cannot be run for this reason. Appendix 1 presents variables definitions. 
Standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10 percent level; ** significant at 5 percent level; *** 
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(1) (2)  (3)  (4) 
Victim of a crime  -0.02  -0.17  -0.03  -0.23 
   (0.03)  (0.22)  (0.03)  (0.24) 
Victim of a violent robbery -0.03  -0.20  -0.03  -0.22 
   (0.03)  (0.24)  (0.04)  (0.25) 
Number of violent robberies  -0.02  -0.18  -0.01  -0.09 
   (0.02)  (0.14)  (0.02)  (0.17) 
Respondent victim of a violent crime   -0.00  -0.01  0 .00  0.02 
   (0.49)  (0.38)  (0.05)  (0.41) 
Victim of crime with the use of arms  0.02  0.12  0.00  0.02 
   (0.07)  (0.49)  (0.07)  (0.50) 
Victim of injuries or threats   -0.14   -1.37  -0.14  -1.37 
   0.10    1.12  0.102  1.12 
Victim of homicide  -0.20    -0.20   
   (0.18)    (0.18)   
Victim of sexual offense  -0.03  -0.21  -0.03  -0.19 
   (0.08)  (0.68)  (0.09)  (0.68) 
Victim of kidnapping  -0.00  -0.02  0.00  0.08 
   (0.13)  (1.42)  (0.14)  (1.42) 
Victim of burglary, auto theft, 
motorcycle theft, larceny, fraud or 
corruption     
-0.01 -0.06  -0.02  -0.14 
(0.03) (0.24)  (0.04)  (0.25) 
Observations 1,766  490  1,552  424 
Number of households  883  245  776  212 
Notes: Columns (1) and (3) present OLS regressions with households fixed effects. Columns (2) and (4) 
present Logit regressions with households fixed effects. Each cell presents the coefficient on the independent 
variable from a different regression that also includes time-fixed effects. In columns (1) and (2) we consider 
responses from any household member. In columns (3) and (4) we only consider households where the same 
respondent answered both surveys. The number of observations in the Logit regressions is reduced when 
households fixed effects predict success or failure with certainty. Some Logit regressions cannot be run for 
this reason. Appendix 1 presents variables definitions. Standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10 
percent level; ** significant at 5 percent level; *** significant at 1 percent level. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Victim of a crime  0.00  0.04  -0.01  -0.06 
   (0.03)  (0.21)  (0.03)  (0.24) 
Victim of a violent robbery  0.05*  0.44*  0.04  0.30 
   (0.03)  (0.25)  (0.03)  (0.27) 
Number of violent robberies  0.03**  0.32**  0.04*  0.32* 
   (0.02)  (0.15)  (0.02)  (0.18) 
Respondent victim of a violent crime  0.06  0.38  0.05  0.30 
   (0.05)  (0.34)  (0.05)  (0.35) 
Victim of crime with the use of arms  0.05  0.37  0.04  0.27 
   (0.06)  (0.50)  (0.07)  (0.51) 
Victim of injuries or threats  -0.04  -0.76  0.01  -0.06 
   (0.08)  (1.24)  (0.08)  (1.43) 
Victim of homicide  -0.24  -0.58  0.24  -0.59 
   (0.42)  (1.23)  (0.42)  (1.23) 
Victim of sexual offense  -0.03  -0.67   -0.08  -0.67 
   (0.07)  (0.71)  (0.07)  (0.71) 
Victim of kidnapping  0.25    0.26   
    (0.11)  (0.12)  
Victim of burglary, auto theft, motorcycle 
theft, larceny, fraud or corruption      
-0.04 -0.32 -0.05   -0.35 
(0.03) (0.24) (0.03) (0.26) 
Observations 1932  532  1658  468 
Number of households  966  266  829  234 
Notes: Columns (1) and (3) present OLS regressions with households fixed effects. Columns (2) and (4) 
present Logit regressions with households fixed effects.  Each cell presents the coefficient on the 
independent variable from a different regression that also includes time-fixed effects.  In columns (1) and 
(2) we consider responses from any household member. In columns (3) and (4) we only consider 
households where the same respondent answered both surveys. The number of observations in the Logit 
regressions is reduced when households fixed effects predict success or failure with certainty. Some Logit 
regressions cannot be run for this reason. Appendix 1 presents variables definitions. Standard errors in 
parentheses. * Significant at 10 percent level; ** significant at 5 percent level; *** significant at 1 percent 
level. 
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Table 9. Crime Victimization, Happiness and Beliefs by Group 
 
   Happiness  Inequality 
Perceptions  Heavy-handed  Meritocratic 
Beliefs 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Men             
Victim of a crime  0.20  -0.03  -0.04  0.03 
   (0.16)  (0.22)  (0.05)  (0.05) 
Observations  614  596  370  512 
Number of households  307  298  185  256 
              
Women             
Victim of a crime  -0.01  -0.51**  -0.08**  -0.03 
   (0.12)  (0.20)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
Observations  1306  1250  734  1146 
Number of households  653  625  367  573 
              
Educated             
Victim of a crime  -0.04  -0.11  -0.11**  0.03 
   (0.13)  (0.19)  (0.05)  (0.05) 
Observations  857  867  528  724 
Number of households  467  471  284  396 
              
Less Educated             
Victim of a crime  0.24  -0.42  -0.04  -0.05 
   (0.17)  (0.28)  (0.05)  (0.05) 
Observations  1056  972  573  927 
Number of households  568  525  306  499 
              
Young             
Victim of a crime  -0.11  -0.24  -0.10**  0.01 
   (0.13)  (0.21)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
Observations  882  858  549  776 
Number of households  451  439  280  396 
              
Old             
Victim of a crime  0.22  -0.48**  -0.01  -0.03 
   (0.15)  (0.23)  (0.05)  (0.04) 
Observations  984  937  522  838 
Number of households  503  479  266  428 
              
Non Victim in baseline survey             
Victim of a crime  -0.09  -0.39  -0.11**  0.00 
   (0.16)  (0.26)  (0.06)  (0.05) 
Observations  1,150  1,098  644  1,000 
Number of households  575  549  322  500 
Notes: All columns present OLS regressions with households fixed effects. Each cell presents the coefficient 
on the independent variable from a different regression that also includes time-fixed effects. We only consider 
households where the same respondent answered both surveys. The group Less Educated consists of those 
respondents that reported high school as their maximum level of education. The group Educated consists of 
those respondents that reached tertiary or university levels of education. The group Young consists of those 
respondents that reported having 50 years or less. The group Non Victim in baseline survey consists of those 
respondents that reported their household members not having suffered a crime in the 12 months prior to the 
survey. Appendix 1 presents variables definitions. Standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10 percent 
level; ** significant at 5 percent level; *** significant at 1 percent level. Table 10. Crime Victimization, Happiness and Beliefs: Cross-Sectional Results 
 
Independent Variables 
Any household respondent  Same household respondent 











(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Victim of a crime  -0.04  -0.28***  0.03  -0.02  -0.02  -0.27**  0.02  -0.03 
   (0.08)  (0.11)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.08)  (0.11)  (0.03)  (0.02) 
Victim of a violent robbery  -0.10  -0.34***  0.05  0.00  -0.07  -0.36***  0.04  0.00 
   (0.09)  (0.13)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.10)  (0.14)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
Number of violent robberies  -0.01  -0.11*  0.03  0.00  0.00  -0.13  0.03*  0.00 
   (0.05)  (0.07)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.06)  (0.08)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
Respondent victim of a violent crime  -0.11  -0.08  0.03  -0.04  -0.05  -0.15  0.04  -0.05 
   (0.15)  (0.18)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.15)  (0.19)  (0.05)  (0.04) 
Victim of crime with the use of arms  0.07  0.10  0.05  -0.05  0.19  0.22  0.07  -0.07 
   (0.19)  (0.19)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.19)  (0.19)  (0.06)  (0.05) 
Victim of injuries or threats  0.08  0.17  0.07  -0.04  0.17  0.44  0.02  -0.04 
   (0.30)  (0.51)  (0.12)  (0.09)  (0.32)  (0.54)  (0.14)  (0.10) 
Victim of homicide  -2.78**  0.12  0.05  -0.25  -2.79**  0.12  0.06  -0.24 
   (1.15)  (0.83)  (0.27)  (0.26)  (1.15)  (0.84)  (0.27)  (0.26) 
Victim of sexual offense  -0.46  -0.30  -0.20***  -0.00  -0.38  -0.24  -0.19***  -0.01 
   (0.29)  (0.30)  (0.05)  (0.07)  (0.30)  (0.30)  (0.05)  (0.07) 
Victim of kidnapping  0.13  -0.64  0.11  0.11  -0.10  -0.52  0.06  0.18** 
   (0.39)  (0.53)  (0.16)  (0.10)  (0.41)  (0.57)  (0.17)  (0.08) 
Victim of burglary, auto theft, motorcycle theft, larceny, 
fraud or corruption 
-0.09    -0.14  0.01  -0.01  -0.07  -0.13  -0.01  -0.01 
(0.09)  (0.12)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.13)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
Observations  2,224  2,140  1,294  1,932  1,920  1,846  1,104  1,658 
Notes: All columns present repeated OLS cross sectional regressions without household fixed effects. Each cell presents the coefficient on the independent variable from a different 
regression. In columns (1) to (4) we consider responses from any household member. In columns (5) to (8) we only consider households where the same respondent answered both surveys. 
Appendix 1 presents variables definitions. Standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10 percent level; ** significant at 5 percent level; *** significant at 1 percent level. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Δ Victim of a crime  0.09 0.08 0.05 0.04 -0.03  0.1 0.05 0.04 0.03 -0.03
   (0.13) (0.11) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.13) (0.11) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Death of  relative  0.08 0.21 -0.01 -0.06 0.04 
   (0.17) (0.15) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
Disease of relative  0.08 -0.12 0.01 -0.01 0.03 
   (0.20) (0.19) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Married / partnered 0.00 -0.23 0.08 0.03 0.05 
   (0.63) (0.57) (0.18) (0.16) (0.16) 
Break-up 0.07 -0.42 -0.08 -0.06 0.00 
   (0.45) (0.41) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) 
Widowed -0.11 -0.14 -0.10 -0.27* 0.03 
   (0.60) (0.52) (0.15) (0.14) (0.15) 
Child married / partnered -0.26 -0.37 0.03 0.02 0.11 
   (0.29) (0.26) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) 
Child break-up -0.26 -0.46 -0.05 -0.04 0.19* 
   (0.39) (0.35) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Improved economic  situation  -0.01 0.18 -0.02 0.01 -0.05  0.01 0.22 -0.02 0.02 -0.06
   (0.23) (0.21) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)  (0.22) (0.20) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Worsened economic  situation  -0.13 -0.60*** -0.07 -0.12** 0.22*** -0.15 -0.61*** -0.07 -0.12** 0.21*** 
   (0.20) (0.18) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)  (0.20) (0.18) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Child  improved economic  situation  0.22 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.04  0.18 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.05
   (0.22) (0.20) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)  (0.22) (0.19) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
Child worsened economic  situation  -0.46 -0.65** -0.20** -0.19** 0.19** -0.42 -0.75*** -0.22*** -0.20*** 0.23*** 
   (0.30) (0.27) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08)  (0.29) (0.26) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07)
Child birth  0.62 0.66 0.15 0.10 -0.13 
   (0.49) (0.44) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) 
Grandchild birth  -0.02 0.08 0.02 0.03 -0.04 
   (0.22) (0.19) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) 
Observations 618 636 635 633 647  623 642 641 639 653
Notes: We only consider households where the same respondent answered both surveys. We only consider answers from the second survey wave. The difference between 
Table 11 and 11 is that the former has ∆ Victim of a Crime as one of the independent variables and the latter has Victim of a Crime instead. Each column presents the 
coefficients on the independent variables from a different OLS regression. Appendix 1 presents variables definitions. Standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10 
percent level; ** significant at 5 percent level; *** significant at 1 percent level. 
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Table 12. Crime Victimization, Happiness and Personal Shocks 
 













(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Victim of a crime  -0.19 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.05  -0.15 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.05
   (0.16) (0.14) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.16) (0.14) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Death of  relative  0.08 0.20 -0.02 -0.06 0.04 
   (0.17) (0.15) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
Disease of relative  0.13 -0.09 0.00 -0.00 0.02 
   (0.21) (0.19) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Married / partnered -0.05 -0.24 0.10 0.03 0.06 
   (0.63) (0.57) (0.18) (0.16) (0.17) 
Break-up 0.07 -0.47 -0.09 -0.07 0.01 
   (0.45) (0.40) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) 
Widowed -0.18 -0.14 -0.12 -0.21 0.10 
   (0.60) (0.51) (0.15) (0.14) (0.15) 
Child married / partnered -0.29 -0.39 0.02 0.01 0.12 
   (0.29) (0.26) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) 
Child break-up -0.27 -0.36 -0.03 -0.03 0.17* 
   (0.39) (0.34) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) 
Improved economic  situation  0.05 0.17 -0.03 0.01 -0.06  0.06 0.22 -0.02 0.02 -0.08
   (0.23) (0.21) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)  (0.22) (0.20) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Worsened economic  situation  -0.13 -0.61*** -0.08 -0.12** 0.22*** -0.14 -0.62*** -0.08 -0.12** 0.21*** 
   (0.20) (0.18) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)  (0.20) (0.18) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Child  improved economic  situation  0.19 0.09 0.02 0.02 0.04  0.16 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.05
   (0.22) (0.19) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)  (0.22) (0.19) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
Child worsened economic  situation  -0.47 -0.66** -0.20** -0.19*** 0.19** -0.41 -0.75*** -0.22*** -0.20*** 0.23*** 
   (0.30) (0.27) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08)  (0.29) (0.26) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07)
Child Birth  0.57 0.66 0.15 0.09 -0.12 
   (0.49) (0.44) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) 
Grandchild Birth  -0.05 0.11 0.02 0.03 -0.04 
   (0.22) (0.19) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) 
Observations 618 638 637 635 649  623 644 643 641 655
Notes: We only consider households where the same respondent answered both surveys. We only consider answers from the second survey wave. The difference between 
Table 11 and 12 is that the former has ∆ Victim of a Crime as one of the independent variables and the latter has Victim of a Crime instead. Each column presents the 
coefficients on the independent variables from a different OLS regression. Appendix 1 presents the definition of the variables. Standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 
10 percent level; ** significant at 5 percent level; *** significant at 1 percent level. 
 
 